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SENSITIVE

PLEASE PASS TO IO, IO/T, ISN/NESS Richard J.K. Stratford; and
DOE/MNSA Adam Scheinman, Richard Goorevich, and Melissa Krupa

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ENRG](#) [IAEA](#) [KNNP](#) [NPT](#) [TREL](#) [BR](#)

SUBJECT: Brazil Views National Intelligence Report as Positive and
Says IAEA Scrutiny of Iran Should Increase

REF: STATE 162558

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11. (SBU) Summary: On December 4, 2007, per REFTEL POLCouns and ESTHoff met with the Head of the Ministry of External Relations' Department of Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies, Minister Santiago Mourao, to discuss the recent release of the USG National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) regarding Iran's nuclear activities. The report was released on the eve of IAEA Director General, ElBaradei's visit to Brazil. Mourao said that in general the GOB reads the NIE as the USG does, namely that the conclusions of the report are positive and that international efforts to temporarily prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state have been successful. To this end, Mourao stated that continued pressure and scrutiny of Iran's nuclear activities is necessary. Mourao suggested that, in light of this new assessment, the scrutiny of Iran's nuclear activities via the IAEA should take precedence over pressure via the UN Security Council. End Summary.

12. (SBU) In delivering REFTEL non-paper and NIE key judgments, POLCouns stressed three key points: 1) Iran's nuclear weapons development activities stalled in 2003, but it remains unclear whether Iran still intends develop them in the future; 2) international pressure and scrutiny of Iran's activities succeeded in stopping Iran's nuclear weapons program for the moment; and 3) the USG asks that the international community continue to apply pressure and scrutiny to Iran's nuclear activities.

13. (SBU) In principle, Mourao said that the GOB agrees with the USG regarding the implications of the NIE. Mourao understood immediately the significance of the fact that Iran's nuclear weapons program was halted in 2003, agreeing that continued pressure and scrutiny of Iran's nuclear activities is necessary. Mourao emphasized that the GOB believes, and the NIE demonstrates, that it was international scrutiny via the IAEA that effectively stalled Iran's nuclear aspirations. This, he said, should help to "raise the profile of the IAEA." Thus, Mourao said that the GOB would, as it has in the past, continue to be insistent with Iran that it increase its cooperation and transparency regarding IAEA inspections and the NIE should support international insistence that Iran comply with IAEA inspections.

14. (SBU) Mourao went on to ask, given that the NIE suggests that Iran is not an imminent threat with regard to its nuclear weapons capability, how the NIE would affect ongoing negotiations. POLCouns replied that it remains important that international efforts to pressure and scrutinize Iran continue unabated and that these

estimates should not affect negotiations.

COMMENT

15. (SBU) GOB reaction to the NIE seems to be positive overall and it remains committed to efforts which seek to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons technology. However, Mourao hinted that, as a result of the NIE, he thought the UNSC should take a lower profile on the issue in favor of the IAEA. Public reaction to the NIE should become more evident with the appearance of the news of its release in local press and during the visit to IAEA Director General, ElBaradei to Brazil later this week. Post will report on media reaction in septel. End Comment.

SOBEL